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### Implicatures: Some Open Questions

According to Grice, implicatures are part of what a speaker communicates, hence part of speaker meaning – and speaker meaning is a matter of speaker intentions. Some scholars (Green 2002, Saul 2002 and 2007, Sbisà 2007) stress the normative character of conversational implicatures, more than their psychological dimension. In this perspective, conversational implicatures don't correspond to what the speaker intends to implicate, or to what the addressee successfully infers: conversational implicatures should be interpreted as enriching or correcting inferences licensed by the text. This means not only that the addressee is capable of working out the implicature, but also that she *should* have worked it out – that she may rightfully attribute to the speaker the intention of conveying it. Implicatures therefore have a normative status as integration or correction of an utterance, justified by an appropriate argumentative path. This means that the speaker may be wrong about an implicature: even if she does not intend to convey a particular implicature, there are cases in which this should in any case be worked out by the addressee. Saul, in particular, argues against a common understanding of Grice according to which speaker meaning divides exhaustively into what is said and what is implicated; she distinguishes between utterer-implicature (intended by the speaker, but not recognized by the addressee), audience-implicature (recognized by the addressee but not intended by the speaker) and conversational implicature. In addition, conversational implicatures are more than merely intended by the speaker and recognized by the addressee: implicating (con conversationally) amounts to making available to the addressee the implicit message S wants to communicate. The idea of an implicature that the speaker does not intend to convey is not completely persuasive. In Grice's theory conversational implicatures are speaker-meant – conscious and even "designed". This means that inferences derived by the addressee but not intended by the speaker should not count as conversational implicatures. On the contrary, in my opinion propositions intended by S and not recognized by A should count as implicatures, if S has made her communicative intention available to her audience.

### References

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